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Abstract
Previous works have studied how to use proactive recovery to build intrusion-tolerant replicated
systems that are resilient to any number of faults, as long as recoveries are faster than an upper-bound
on fault production assumed at system deployment time. In this work, we propose a complementary
approach that combines proactive recovery with services that allow correct replicas to react and
recover replicas that they detect or suspect to be compromised. One key feature of our proactive-
reactive recovery approach is that, despite recoveries, it guarantees the availability of the minimum
amount of system replicas necessary to sustain system’s correct operation. We design a proactive-
reactive recovery service based on a hybrid distributed system model and show, as a case study, how
this service can effectively be used to augment the resilience of an intrusion-tolerant firewall adequate
for the protection of critical infrastructures.
Keywords: Intrusion Tolerance, Proactive Recovery, Reactive Recovery, Firewall.
1 Introduction
One of the most challenging requirements of distributed systems being developed nowadays is to ensure
that they operate correctly despite the occurrence of accidental and malicious faults (including security
attacks and intrusions). This problem is specially relevant for an important class of systems that are
∗This work was partially supported by the EC through project IST-2004-27513 (CRUTIAL) and NoE IST-4-026764-NOE
(RESIST), and by the FCT through project POSI/EIA/60334/2004 (RITAS) and the Large-Scale Informatic Systems Laboratory
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employed in mission-critical applications such as the SCADA systems used to manage critical infras-
tructures like the Power grid. One approach that promises to satisfy this requirement and that gained
momentum recently is intrusion tolerance [31]. This approach recognizes the difficulty in building a
completely reliable and secure system and advocates the use of redundancy to ensure that a system still
delivers its service correctly even if some of its components are compromised.
A problem with “classical” intrusion-tolerant solutions based on Byzantine fault-tolerant replication
algorithms is the assumption that the system operates correctly only if at most f out of n of its replicas
are compromised. The problem here is that given a sufficient amount of time, a malicious and intelligent
adversary can find ways to compromise more than f replicas and collapse the whole system.
Recently, some works showed that this problem can be solved (or at least minimized) if the replicas
are rejuvenated periodically, using a technique called proactive recovery [21]. These previous works
propose intrusion-tolerant replicated systems that are resilient to any number of faults [5, 34, 4, 17, 25].
The idea is simple: replicas are periodically rejuvenated to remove the effects of malicious attacks/faults.
Rejuvenation procedures may change the cryptographic keys and/or load a clean version of the operating
system. If the rejuvenation is performed sufficiently often, then an attacker is unable to corrupt enough
replicas to break the system. Therefore, using proactive recovery, one can increase the resilience of any
intrusion-tolerant replicated system able to tolerate up to f faults/intrusions: an unbounded number of
intrusions may occur during its lifetime, as long as no more than f occur between rejuvenations. Both the
interval between consecutive rejuvenations and f must be specified at system deployment time according
to the expected rate of fault production.
An inherent limitation of proactive recovery is that a malicious replica can execute any action to
disturb the system’s normal operation (e.g., flood the network with arbitrary packets) and there is little
or nothing that a correct replica (that detects this abnormal behavior) can do to stop/recover the faulty
replica. Our observation is that a more complete solution should allow correct replicas that detect or
suspect that some replica is faulty to accelerate the recovery of this replica. We named this solution as
proactive-reactive recovery and claim that it may improve the overall performance of a system under
attack by reducing the amount of time a malicious replica has to disturb system normal operation with-
out sacrificing periodic rejuvenation, which ensures that even dormant faults will be removed from the
system.
This work proposes the combination of proactive and reactive recovery in order to increase the
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overall resilience of intrusion-tolerant systems that seek perpetual unattended correct operation. The key
property of our approach is that, as long as the fault exhibited by a replica is detectable, this replica will
be recovered as soon as possible, ensuring that there is always an amount of system replicas available to
sustain system’s correct operation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine reactive and
proactive recovery in a single approach.
We recognize that perfect Byzantine failure detection is impossible to attain in a general way, since
what characterizes a malicious behavior is dependent on the application semantics [9, 10, 1, 13]. How-
ever, we argue that an important class of malicious faults can be detected, specially the ones generated
automatically by malicious programs such as virus, worms, and even botnets. These kinds of attacks
have little or no intelligence to avoid being detected by replicas carefully monitoring the environment.
However, given the imprecisions of the environment, some behaviors can be interpreted as faults, while
in fact they are only effects of overloaded replicas. In this way, a reactive recovery strategy must address
the problem of (possible wrong) suspicions to ensure that recoveries are scheduled according to some
fair policy in such a way that there is always a sufficient number of replicas for the system to be avail-
able. In fact, dealing with imperfect failure detection is the most complex aspect of the proactive-reactive
recovery service proposed in this work.
In order to show how the proactive-reactive recovery service can be used to enhance the depend-
ability of a system and to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, we applied it to the construction of
an intrusion-tolerant protection device (a kind of firewall) for critical infrastructures. This device, called
CIS (CRUTIAL Information Switch) Protection Service, CIS for short, is a fundamental component of
an architecture for critical infrastructures protection proposed by some of the authors recently [30] in
the context of the EU-IST CRUTIAL project1. The CIS augmented with proactive-reactive recovery
represents a very strong and dependable solution for the critical infrastructures protection problem: this
firewall is shown to resist powerful Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks from both outside hosts (e.g., lo-
cated somewhere in the Internet) and inside compromised replicas, while maintaining availability and an
adequate throughput for most critical infrastructures’ applications.
This work presents the following contributions: (i.) it introduces the concept of proactive-reactive
recovery and presents a design for a generic proactive-reactive recovery service that can be integrated
in any intrusion-tolerant system; (ii.) it shows how imperfect failure detection (i.e., suspicions) can
1CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL resilience: http://crutial.cesiricerca.it.
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be managed to recover suspected replicas without sacrificing the availability of the overall system; and
(iii.) it presents and evaluates an intrusion-tolerant perpetually resilient firewall for critical infrastructure
protection, which uses the proactive-reactive recovery service.
2 Proactive-Reactive Recovery
Recently, some of the authors showed that proactive recovery can only be implemented with a few syn-
chrony assumptions [26, 24]: in short, in an asynchronous system a compromised replica can delay its
recovery (e.g., by making its local clock slower) for a sufficient amount of time to allow more than f
replicas to be attacked. To overcome this fundamental problem, the approach proposed in this work is
based on a hybrid system model [29]. Before presenting the proactive-reactive approach and its founda-
tion model, we precisely state the system model on which it is based.
2.1 System Model
We consider a hybrid system model [29] in which the system is composed of two parts, with distinct
properties and assumptions, let us call them payload and wormhole.
Payload. Any-synchrony system with n ≥ a f + bk+ 1 replicas P1, ...,Pn. For the purpose of our work,
this part can range from fully asynchronous to fully synchronous. At most f replicas can be subject to
Byzantine failures in a given recovery period and at most k replicas can be recovered at the same time.
The exact threshold depends on the application. For example, an asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant
state machine replication system requires n≥ 3 f +2k+1 while the CIS presented in Section 3 requires
only n ≥ 2 f + k+1. If a replica does not fail between two recoveries it is said to be correct, otherwise
it is said to be faulty. We assume fault-independence for payload replicas, i.e., the probability of a
replica being faulty is independent of the occurrence of faults in other replicas. This assumption can be
substantiated in practice through the extensive use of several kinds of diversity [20].
Wormhole. Synchronous subsystem with n local wormholes in which at most f local wormholes can
fail by crash. These local wormholes are connected through a synchronous and secure control channel,
isolated from other networks. There is one local wormhole per payload replica and we assume that
when a local wormhole i crashes, the corresponding payload replica i crashes together. Since the local
wormholes are synchronous and the control channel used by them is isolated and synchronous too, we
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assume several services in this environment:
1. wormhole clocks have a known precision, obtained by a clock synchronization protocol;
2. there is point-to-point timed reliable communication between every pair of local wormholes;
3. there is a timed reliable broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time [12];
4. there is a timed atomic broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time [12].
One should note that all of these services can be easily implemented in the crash-failure synchronous
distributed system model [28].
2.2 The Proactive Resilience Model (PRM)
The PRM [25] defines a system enhanced with proactive recovery through a model composed of two
parts: the proactive recovery subsystem and the payload system, the latter being proactively recovered
by the former. Each of these two parts obeys different timing assumptions and different fault models, and
should be designed accordingly. The payload system executes the “normal” applications and protocols.
Thus, the payload synchrony and fault model entirely depend on the applications/protocols executing
in this part of the system. For instance, the payload may operate in an asynchronous Byzantine way.
The proactive recovery subsystem executes the proactive recovery protocols that rejuvenate the applica-
tions/protocols running in the payload part. This subsystem is more demanding in terms of timing and
fault assumptions, and it is modeled as a distributed component called Proactive Recovery Wormhole
(PRW).
The distributed PRW is composed of a local module in every host called the local PRW, which
may be interconnected by a synchronous and secure control channel. The PRW executes periodic reju-
venations through a periodic timely execution service with two parameters: TP and TD. Namely, each
local PRW executes a rejuvenation procedure F in rounds, each round is initiated within TP from the
last triggering, and the execution time of F is bounded by TD. Notice that if local recoveries are not
coordinated, then the system may present unavailability periods during which a large number (possibly
all) replicas are recovering. For instance, if the replicated system tolerates up to f arbitrary faults, then
it will typically become unavailable if f + 1 replicas recover at the same time, even if no “real” fault
occurs. Therefore, if a replicated system able to tolerate f Byzantine servers is enhanced with periodic
recoveries, then availability is guaranteed by (i.) defining the maximum number of replicas allowed to
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recover in parallel (call it k); and (ii.) deploying the system with a sufficient number of replicas to tolerate
f Byzantine servers and k simultaneous recovery servers.
Figure 1 illustrates the rejuvenation process. Replicas are recovered in groups of at most k elements,
by some specified order: for instance, replicas {P1, ...,Pk} are recovered first, then replicas {Pk+1, ...,P2k}
follow, and so on. Notice that k defines the number of replicas that may recover simultaneously, and
consequently the number of distinct d nk e rejuvenation groups that recover in sequence. For instance, if
k = 2, then at most two replicas may recover simultaneously in order to guarantee availability. This
means also that at least dn2e rejuvenation groups (composed of two replicas) will need to exist, and they
can not recover at the same time. Notice that the number of rejuvenation groups determines a lower-
bound on the value of TP and consequently defines the minimum window of time an adversary has to
compromise more than f replicas. From the figure it is easy to see that TP ≥ d nk eTD.
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Figure 1: Relationship between the rejuvenation period TP, the rejuvenation execution time TD, and k.
2.3 The Proactive-Reactive Recovery Wormhole (PRRW)
The PRRW offers a single service: the proactive-reactive recovery service. This service needs input
information from the payload replicas in order to trigger reactive recoveries. This information is obtained
through two interface functions: W suspect( j) and W detect( j). Figure 2 presents this idea.
A payload replica i calls W suspect( j) to notify the PRRW that the replica j is suspected of being
failed. This means that replica i suspects replica j but it does not know for sure if it is really failed. Oth-
erwise, if replica i knows without doubt that replica j is failed, thenW detect( j) is called instead. Notice
that the service is generic enough to deal with any kind of replica failures, e.g., crash and Byzantine.
For instance, replicas may: use an unreliable crash failure detector [6] (or a muteness detector [9]) and
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Figure 2: PRRW architecture.
call W suspect( j) when a replica j is suspected of being crashed; or detect that a replica j is sending
unexpected messages or messages with incorrect content [1, 13], calling W detect( j) in this case.
If f +1 different replicas suspect and/or detect that replica j is failed, then this replica is recovered.
This recovery can be done immediately, without endangering availability, in the presence of at least f +1
detections, given that in this case at least one correct replica detected that replica j is really failed. Other-
wise, if there are only f +1 suspicions, the replica may be correct and the recovery must be coordinated
with the periodic proactive recoveries in order to guarantee that a minimum number of correct replicas is
always alive to ensure the system availability. The quorum of f +1 in terms of suspicions or detections
is needed to avoid recoveries triggered by faulty replicas: at least one correct replica must detect/suspect
a replica for some recovery action to be taken.
As will be made clear in the next sections, we do not provide any means for a replica to “unsuspect”
some other replica it previously suspected. We choose to not provide this service to avoid complica-
tions with the computation of f + 1 suspects (some replicas could see it while others not) and because
suspicions are cleaned when the replica is recovered.
It is worth to notice that the service provided by the proactive-reactive recovery wormhole is com-
pletely orthogonal to the failure/intrusion detection strategy used by a system. The proposed service
only exports operations to be called when a replica is detected/suspected to be faulty. In this sense, any
approach for fault detection (including Byzantine) [6, 9, 1, 13], system monitoring [7] and/or intrusion
detection [8, 18] can be integrated in a system that uses the PRRW. The overall effectiveness of our ap-
proach, i.e., how fast a compromised replica is recovered, is a direct consequence of detection/diagnosis
accuracy.
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2.3.1 Scheduling Recoveries without Harming Availability
The proactive-reactive recovery service initiates recoveries both periodically (time-triggered) and when-
ever something bad is detected or suspected (event-triggered). As explained in Section 2.2, periodic
recoveries are done in groups of at most k replicas, so no more than k replicas are recovering at the same
time. However, the interval between the recovery of each group is not tight. Instead we allocate d fk e in-
tervals for recovery between periodic recoveries such that they can be used by event-triggered recoveries.
This amount of time is allocated to make possible at most f recoveries between each periodic recovery,
in this way being able to handle the maximum number of faults assumed.
The approach is based on real-time scheduling with an aperiodic server task to model aperiodic
tasks [27]. The idea is to consider the action of recovering as a resource and to ensure that no more than
k correct replicas will be recovering simultaneously. As explained before, this condition is important to
ensure that the system always stays available. Two types of real-time tasks are utilized by the proposed
mechanism:
• task Ri: represents the periodic recovery of up to k replicas (in parallel). All these tasks have worst
case execution time TD and period TP;
• task A: is the aperiodic server task, which can handle at most d fk e recoveries (of up to k replicas)
every time it is activated. This task has worst case execution time d fk eTD and period (d fk e+1)TD.
Task Ri is executed at up to k different local wormholes, while task A is executed in all wormholes,
but only the ones with the payload detected/suspected of being faulty are (aperiodically) recovered. The
time needed for executing one A and one Ri is called the recovery slot i and is denoted by Tslot. Every
slot i has d fk e recovery subslots belonging to the A task, each one denoted by Sip, plus a Ri. Figure 3
illustrates how time-triggered periodic and event-triggered aperiodic recoveries are combined.
In the figure it is easy to see that when our reactive recovery scheduling approach is employed, the
value of TP must be increased. In fact, TP should be greater or equal than dnk e(d fk e+1)TD, which means
that reactive recoveries increase the rejuvenation period by a factor of (d fk e+ 1). This is not a huge
increase since f is expected to be small. In order to simplify the presentation of the algorithms, in the
remaining of the report it is assumed that TP = dnk e(d fk e+1)TD.
Notice that a reactive recovery only needs to be scheduled according to the described mechanism if
the replica i to recover is only suspected of being failed (it is not assuredly failed), i.e., if less than f +1
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Figure 3: Recovery schedule (in an Si j or Ri subslot there can be at most k parallel replica recoveries).
replicas have called W detect() (but the total number of suspicions and detections is higher than f +1).
If the wormholeWi knows with certainty that replica i is faulty, i.e., if a minimum of f +1 replicas have
called W detect(i), replica i can be recovered without availability concerns, since it is accounted as one
of the f faulty replicas.
2.3.2 The PRRW Algorithm
The proactive-reactive recovery service presented in Algorithm 1 is now explained in detail. The algo-
rithms executed inside the PRRW are implemented as threads in a real-time environment with a pre-
emptive scheduler where static priorities are defined from 1 to 3 (priority 1 being the highest). In these
algorithms we do not consider explicitly the clock skew and drift, since we assume that these deviations
are small due to the periodic clock synchronization, and thus are compensated in the protocol parameters
(i.e., in the time bounds for the execution of certain operations).
Parameters and variables. This algorithm uses six parameters: i, n, f , k, TP, and TD. The id of the local
wormhole is represented by i; n specifies the total number of replicas and consequently the total number
of local wormholes; f defines the maximum number of faulty replicas; k specifies the maximum number
of replicas that recover at the same time; TP defines the maximum time interval between consecutive
triggers of the recovery procedure (depicted in Figure 3); and TD defines the worst case execution time
of the recovery of a replica. Additionally, four variables are defined: tnext stores the instant when the
next periodic recovery should be triggered by local wormhole i; the Detect set contains the processes
that detected the failure of replica i; the Suspect set contains the processes that suspect replica i of being
failed; and scheduled indicates if a reactive recovery is scheduled for replica i.
Reactive recovery service interface. W suspect( j) and W detect( j) send, respectively, a SUSPECT
or DETECT message to wormhole j, which is the wormhole in the suspected/detected node (lines 1-2).
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Algorithm 1Wormhole proactive-reactive recovery service.
{Parameters}
integer i {Id of the local wormhole}
integer n {Total number of replicas}
integer f {Maximum number of faulty replicas}
integer k {Max. replicas that recover at the same time}
integer TP {Periodic recovery period}
integer TD {Recovery duration time}
{Constants}
integer Tslot , (d fk e+1)TD {Slot duration time}
{Variables}
integer tnext = 0 {Instant of the next periodic recovery
start}
set Detect =∅ {Processes that detected me as failed}
set Suspect = ∅ {Processes suspecting me of being
failed} bool scheduled = false {Indicates if a reactive re-
covery is scheduled for me}
{Reactive recovery interface threads with priority 3}
serviceW suspect( j)
1: send( j,〈SUSPECT〉)
serviceW detect( j)
2: send( j,〈DETECT〉)
upon receive( j,〈SUSPECT〉)
3: Suspect← Suspect∪{ j}
upon receive( j,〈DETECT〉)
4: Detect← Detect∪{ j}
{Periodic recovery thread with priority 1}
procedure proactive recovery()
5: synchronize global clock()
6: tnext← global clock()+(d i−1k eTslot+ d fk eTD)
7: loop
8: wait until global clock() = tnext
9: recovery()
10: tnext = tnext+TP
11: end loop
procedure recovery()
12: recovery actions()
13: Detect←∅
14: Suspect←∅
15: scheduled← false
{Reactive recovery execution threads with priority 2}
upon |Detect| ≥ f +1
16: recovery()
upon (|Detect|< f +1)∧ (|Suspect∪Detect| ≥ f +1)
17: if ¬scheduled then
18: scheduled← true
19: 〈s,ss〉 ← allocate subslot()
20: if s 6= d ike then
21: wait until global clock() mod TP = sTslot +
ssTD
22: if |Suspect∪Detect| ≥ f +1 then recovery()
23: end if
24: end if
When a local wormhole i receives such a message from wormhole j, j is inserted in the Suspect orDetect
set according to the type of the message (lines 3-4). The content of these sets may trigger a recovery
procedure.
Proactive recovery. The proactive recovery() procedure is triggered by each local wormhole i at boot
time (lines 5-11). It starts by calling a routine that synchronizes the clocks of the local wormholes with
the goal of creating a virtual global clock, and blocks until all local wormholes call it and can start at the
same time. When all local wormholes are ready to start, the virtual global clock is initialized at (global)
time instant 0 (line 5). The primitive global clock() returns the current value of the (virtual) global clock.
After the initial synchronization, the variable tnext is initialized (line 6) in a way that local wormholes
trigger periodic recoveries in groups of up to k replicas according to their id order, and the first periodic
recovery triggered by every local wormhole is finished within TP from the initial synchronization. After
this initialization, the procedure enters an infinite loop where a periodic recovery is triggered within TP
from the last triggering (lines 7-11). The recovery() procedure (lines 12-15) starts by calling the abstract
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function recovery actions() (line 12) that should be implemented according to the logic of the system
using the PRRW. Typically, a recovery starts by saving the state of the local replica if it exists, then the
payload operating system (OS) is shutdown and its code is restored from some read-only medium, and
finally the OS is booted, bringing the replica to a supposedly correct state. The last three lines of the
recovery() procedure re-initialize some variables because the replica should now be correct (lines 13-15).
Reactive recovery. Reactive recoveries can be triggered in two ways: (1) if the local wormhole i receives
at least f +1 DETECT messages, then recovery is initiated immediately because replica i is accounted as
one of the f faulty replicas (line 16); (2) otherwise, if f +1 DETECT or SUSPECT messages arrive, then
replica i is at best suspected of being failed by one correct replica. In both cases, the f +1 bound ensures
that at least one correct replica detected a problem with replica i. In the suspect scenario, recovery does
not have to be started immediately because the replica might not be failed. Instead, if no reactive recovery
is already scheduled (line 17), the aperiodic task finds the closest slot where the replica can be recovered
without endangering the availability of the replicated system. The idea is to allocate one of the (reactive)
recovery subslots depicted in Figure 3. This is done through the function allocate subslot() (line 19 –
explained later). Notice that if the calculated subslot 〈s,ss〉 is located in the slot where the replica will
be proactively recovered, i.e., if s = d ike, then the replica does not need to be reactively recovered (line
20). If this is not the case, then local wormhole i waits for the allocated subslot and then recovers the
corresponding replica (lines 21-22). Notice that the expression global clock() mod TP returns the time
elapsed since the beginning of the current period, i.e., the position of the current global time instant in
terms of the time diagram presented in Figure 3.
Recovery subslot allocation. Subslot management is based on accessing a data structure replicated in all
wormholes through a timed total order broadcast protocol, as described in Algorithm 2. This algorithm
uses one more parameter and one more variable besides the ones defined in Algorithm 1. The parameter
T∆ specifies the upper-bound on the delivery time of a message sent through the synchronous control
network connecting all the local wormholes. Variable Subslot is a table that stores the number of replicas
(up to k) scheduled to recover at each subslot of a recovery slot, i.e., Subslot[〈s,ss〉] gives the number
of processes using subslot ss of slot s (for a maximum of k). This variable is used to keep the subslot
occupation, allowing the local wormholes to find the next available slot when it is necessary to recover a
suspected replica.
A subslot is allocated by local wormhole i through the invocation of the function allocate subslot(),
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Algorithm 2 PRRW recovery slot allocation.
{Parameters (besides the ones defined in Algorithm 1)}
integer T∆ {Bound on message delivery time}
{Variables (besides the ones defined in Algorithm 1)}
table Subslot[〈1,1〉...〈d nk e,d fk e〉] = 0 {Number of processes scheduled to recover at each subslot of a recovery
slot}
procedure allocate subslot()
1: TO-multicast(〈ALLOC, i,global clock()〉)
2: wait until TO-receive(〈ALLOC, i, tsend〉)
3: return local allocate subslot(tsend)
upon TO-receive(〈ALLOC, j, tsend〉)∧ j 6= i
4: local allocate subslot(tsend)
procedure local allocate subslot(tsend)
5: tround← (tsend +T∆) mod TP
6: curr subslot← 〈b troundTslot c+1,btround mod Tslotc+1〉
7: loop
8: curr subslot← next subslot(curr subslot)
9: if Subslot[curr subslot]< k then
10: Subslot[curr subslot] ←
Subslot[curr subslot]+1
11: return curr subslot
12: end if
13: end loop
procedure next subslot(〈s,ss〉)
14: if ss< d fk e then
15: ss← ss+1
16: else if s< d nk e then
17: ss← 0; s← s+1
18: else
19: ss← 0; s← 0
20: end if
21: return 〈s,ss〉
upon (tround← (global clock() mod TP)) mod Tslot = 0
22: if b troundTslot c= 0 then
23: prev slot← d nk e
24: else
25: prev slot← b troundTslot c
26: end if
27: ∀p,Subslot[〈prev slot,p〉]← 0
which timestamps and sends an ALLOC message using total order multicast (line 1) to all local worm-
holes and waits until this message is received (line 2). At this point the function local allocate subslot()
is called and the next available subslot is allocated to the replica (line 3). The combination of total order
multicast with the sending timestamp Tsend ensures that all local wormholes allocate the same subslots
in the same order. The local allocation algorithm is implemented by the local allocate subslot(Tsend)
function (lines 5-13). This function manages the various recovery subslots and assigns them to the repli-
cas that request to be recovered. It starts by calculating the first subslot that may be used for a recovery
according to the latest global time instant when the ALLOC message may be received by any local
wormhole (lines 5-6), then it searches and allocates the next available subslot, i.e., a slot in the future
that has less than k recoveries already scheduled (lines 7-21). Finally, in the beginning of each recovery
slot, all the subslots of the previous recovery slot are deallocated (lines 22-27).
3 Case Study: The CIS Protection Service
In this section we describe how the PRRW component can be extended and integrated to make a
perpetual-resilient operational system. The described system is a protection device for critical infor-
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mation infrastructures (a kind of improved application layer firewall) called CIS Protection Service.
Here we only present a high-level view of the system focusing in the PRRW integration, the complete
description of this system is presented in [3].
3.1 Context and Motivation
Today’s critical infrastructures like the Power Grid are essentially physical processes controlled by com-
puters connected by networks. Once these systems were highly isolated and secure against most security
threats. However, in recent years they evolved in several aspects that greatly increased their exposure
to cyber-attacks coming from the Internet. Firstly, the computers, networks and protocols used in these
systems are no longer proprietary and specific, but standard PCs and networks. Second, most of them are
connected to the Internet and corporate networks. Therefore these infrastructures have a level of vulner-
ability similar to other systems connected to the Internet, but the socio-economic impact of their failure
can be huge. This scenario, reinforced by several recent incidents [32], is generating a great concern
about the security of these infrastructures, especially at government level.
Recently, some of the authors proposed a reference architecture to protect critical infrastructures, in
the context of the CRUTIAL EU-IST project [30]. The idea is to model the whole infrastructure as a set of
protected LANs, representing the typical facilities that compose it (e.g., power transformation substations
or corporate offices), which are interconnected by a wider-area network (WAN). Using this architecture,
we reduce the problem of critical infrastructures protection to the problem of protecting LANs from the
WAN or other LANs. In consequence, our model and architecture allow us to deal both with outsider
threats (protecting a facility from the Internet) and insider threats (protecting a critical host from other
hosts in the same physical facility, by locating them in different LANs). A fundamental component of
this architecture is the CRUTIAL Information Switch (CIS), which is deployed at the borders of a LAN
and is reasonable to connect this LAN with the others and to protect it. This second requirement is
implemented by the CIS Protection Service, which ensures that the incoming and outgoing traffic in/out
of the LAN satisfies the security policy of the infrastructure.
A CIS can not be a simple firewall since that would put the critical infrastructure at most at the
level of security of current (corporate) Internet systems, which is not acceptable since intrusions in those
systems are constantly being reported. Instead, the CIS has several different characteristics, being the
most important its intrusion tolerance, i.e., it operates correctly even if there are intrusions in some of
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Figure 4: Intrusion-tolerant CIS protection service.
its components and withstands a high degree of such hostility from the environment, seeking unattended
perpetual operation. In the next sections we show how the basic intrusion-tolerant design for the CIS can
be integrated to the PRRW to make it attain perpetual correction.
3.2 How the CIS Works
The intrusion-tolerant CIS is replicated in a set of n≥ 2 f +1 machines2 connected both to the protected
LAN and the insecure WAN through traffic replication devices (e.g., a hub or a switch). Figure 4 depicts
the intrusion-tolerant CIS architecture.
The CIS design presents two very interesting challenges that make it essentially different from other
Byzantine fault-tolerant services. The first is that a firewall-like component has to be transparent to
protocols that pass through it, so it can not modify the protocols themselves to obtain intrusion toler-
ance. This also means that recipient nodes (inside the protected network) will ignore any internal CIS
intrusion-tolerance mechanisms, and as such they can not protect themselves from messages forwarded
by faulty replicas not satisfying the security policy. These two challenges are solved through the use
of wormholes [29]: we assume that each replica of the CIS has a trusted component (the W boxes in
Figure 4) that cannot be corrupted. These local wormholes are connected through an isolated network.
Moreover, each CIS replica is deployed in a different operating system (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, Windows
XP), and the operating systems are configured to use different passwords.
In a nutshell, the message processing is done in the following way: each CIS replica receives all
2The CIS design presented here assumes that policies are stateless. In [3] we explain how statefull policies could be
supported.
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packets to the LAN and verifies if these packets satisfy some pre-defined application-level security policy.
If a message is in accordance with some policy, it is accepted by the CIS, and must be forwarded to its
destination in the LAN. Every message approved by a replica is issued to the wormhole to be signed.
The local wormholes vote between themselves and, if the message is approved by at least f +1 replicas,
it is signed using a secret key installed in the wormhole component. Once the message is signed, one of
the replicas (the leader) is responsible for forwarding the approved message to its destination. Besides
message signing, the wormhole is responsible also for leader election. The traffic replication devices in
Figure 4 are responsible for broadcasting the WAN and LAN traffic to all replicas. The LAN replication
device is specially useful to detect if malicious replicas send non-approved messages to the LAN.
3.3 Integrating the CIS and the PRRW
There are two main issues that must be addressed when integrating the PRRW into an intrusion-tolerant
application: the implementation of the recovery actions() procedure (i.e., what actions are done when it
is time to recover a replica) and defining in which situations theW suspect andW detect PRRW services
are called by a replica.
In the case of the CIS, the recovery actions() comprise the execution of the following sequence of
steps:
1. if the replica to be recovered is the current CIS leader, then a new leader must be elected: a message
is sent by the local wormhole of the current leader to all local wormholes informing that the new
leader is the last replica that finished its periodic recovery;
2. the replica is deactivated, i.e., its operating system is shutdown;
3. the replica operating system is restored using some clean image (that can be different from the
previous one);
4. the replica is activated with its new operating system image.
Step 1 is needed only because our replication algorithm requires a leader and the wormhole is re-
sponsible to maintain it. In step 3 the wormhole can select one from several pre-generated operating
system images to be installed on the recovered replica. These images can be substantially different
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(different operating systems, kernel versions, configurations, access passwords, etc.) to enforce fault in-
dependence between recoveries. In step 4 we assume that when the system is rebooted the CIS software
is started automatically.
The PRRW services for informing suspicions and detections of faults are called by the CIS replicas
when they observe something that was not supposed to happen and/or when something that was suppose
to happen does not occur. In the case of the CIS, the constant monitoring of the protected network
allows a replica to detect some malicious behaviors from other replicas. Notice that this can only be
done because our architecture (Figure 4) has a traffic replication device inside the LAN (ensuring that all
replicas see all messages sent by every other replica to the LAN) and it is assumed that all messages sent
by the CIS replicas to the LAN are authenticated3.
Currently, there are two situations in which the PRRW services are called:
(i.) Some replica sends an invalid message to the protected network: if a correct replica detects that some
other replica sent an illegal message (one that was not signed by the wormhole) to the LAN, it can detect
this replica as faulty and call W detect informing that the replica presented a faulty behaviour. From
Algorithm 1 it can be seen that when f +1 replicas detect a faulty replica, it is recovered;
(ii.) The leader fails to forward a certain number of approved messages: if a correct replica knows that
some message was approved by the wormhole and it does not see this message being forwarded to the
LAN it can conclude that something is wrong with the current leader (which was supposed to forward
the message). Due to the many imprecisions considered in the system (asynchrony, replica’s message
losses due to high traffic), it is perfectly possible that a correct leader did not received the message to be
approved or, this message was forwarded but some replica did not receive it from the LAN. To cope with
this, we define an omission threshold for the leader which defines the maximum number of omissions
that a replica can perceive from some leader replica before suspecting it to be faulty. Notice that it is
impossible to know with certainty if the leader is faulty, so replicas call W suspect and not W detect in
this case. From Algorithm 1 it can be seen that when f +1 replicas suspect a faulty replica, a recovery
is scheduled for it.
As will be seen in Section 4, these two interactions between the replicas and the PRRW service
makes much more difficult for a malicious adversary to launch any attack to the protected LAN (in the
sense that it will have much less time). The proof that this design for the CIS is correct and attains
3The substantiation of this assumption in practice will be described in Section 3.4.
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perpetual resilience can be found in [3].
3.4 Prototype
Our implementation uses the XEN virtual machine monitor [2] with the Linux operating system. The
architecture is presented in Figure 5. A XEN system has multiple layers, the lowest and most privileged
of which is XEN itself. XEN may host multiple guest operating systems, every one executed within an
isolated VM or, in XEN terminology, a domain. Domains are scheduled by XEN to make effective use
of the available physical resources (e.g., CPUs). Each guest OS manages its own applications. The first
domain, dom0, is created automatically when the system boots and has special management privileges.
Domain dom0 builds other domains (dom1, dom2, dom3, ...) and manages their virtual devices. It also
performs administrative tasks such as suspending and resuming other VMs, and it can be configured to
execute with higher priority than the remaining VMs.
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Figure 5: CIS Prototype architecture.
As depicted in Figure 5, every replica uses XEN to isolate the payload from the wormhole part.
Local wormholes run in replicas’ domain dom0, and the CIS protection service executes in replicas’
domain dom1. Domain dom0 is configured to execute with higher priority than domain dom1 in every
replica, in order to emulate the real time behavior required by PRRW services. The local wormholes are
connected through an isolated control network.
The recovery actions executed by the PRRWmake use of XEN system calls xm destroy and xm create
to, respectively, shutdown and boot a CIS replica. Note that xm destroy corresponds to a virtual power
off and it is almost instantaneous, whereas a normal shutdown could take several seconds. We avoid the
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delay of a normal shutdown because we assume that the running OS may have been compromised and
thus it cannot be reutilized.
In order to provide a virtual global clock to each local wormhole, we implemented a clock synchro-
nization protocol. There are many clock synchronization algorithms available in the literature suitable
to synchronous environments with crash faults [28]. The protocol we implemented combines techniques
proposed on some of these works and it is now briefly explained. Local wormholes are initially launched
by any order as long as local wormhole 1 is the last one to begin execution. When local wormhole 1
starts executing, it broadcasts a small synchronization message to all wormholes (including itself) and
this message is used by every local wormhole to define the global time instant 0. Then, in order to
maintain the virtual global clocks with a bounded precision, each local wormhole broadcasts a synchro-
nization message exactly when a proactive recovery is triggered. Given that all local wormholes know
when proactive recoveries should be triggered, they can adjust their clocks accordingly. Both mech-
anisms assume that the broadcast reception instant is practically the same everywhere in the control
network, which is substantiated by the fact that the control network is provided by a switch used only by
the local wormholes.
To simplify the design and to avoid changes in the kernel, the CIS prototype operates at the UDP
level, instead of IP level as most firewalls do. Therefore, there was no need to implement packet in-
terception because packets are sent directly to the CIS. Moreover, authentication is not done at the IP
level (as when using IPSEC/AH), but in alternative the wormhole calculates the HMAC4 of the payload
UDP packet, and then the two are concatenated. Notice that this type of authentication implies the same
type of overhead of IP authentication. Given that the CIS prototype operates at the UDP level, we make
use of IP multicast to enforce broadcast in WAN and LAN communication. Therefore, we do not need
physical traffic replication devices in our prototype5. Moreover, the LAN switch uses access control lists
to prevent replicas from spoofing their MAC addresses, and each replica stores a table with the MAC
address of each other replica.
Periodic and reactive recoveries reset the state and restore the code of a replica. While this is useful
to restore the correctness of the replica, it would be interesting if we were able to introduce diversity in
the recovery process. For instance, each recovery could randomize the address space of the replica (e.g.,
4HMAC is a standard for calculating MACs, and in the prototype we used the SHA-1 hash function [19].
5Nevertheless, if the CIS would operate at the IP level, we could configure the WAN and LAN switches to use the failopen
mode in order to force broadcast.
18
using PAX6) in order to minimize the usefulness of the knowledge obtained in the past to increase the
chances of future attacks. The XEN and PAX communities are currently making efforts to release a joint
distribution, and we plan to integrate this mechanism in the prototype when it is available. Nevertheless,
the current version of the prototype already incorporates some diversity mechanisms: we maintain a pool
of OS images with different configurations (e.g., different root passwords, different kernel versions) and
each recovery (proactive or reactive) randomly chooses and boots one of these images.
Domain dom0 executes with higher priority than domain dom1, but since it is based on a normal
Linux OS, it provides no strict real-time guarantees. Currently, only modified versions of Linux and
NetBSD can be run on dom0. However, XEN is continuously being improved and we expect that in the
near future one can use a real-time OS.
4 Experimental Evaluation
The experimental setup was composed by a set of four machines representing the CIS replicas (n = 4)
connected to the three networks defined in our prototype architecture: LAN, WAN, and the control
network (see Figure 5). These networks were defined as separated VLANs configured on two Dell
Gigabit switches. The LAN and control networks shared the same switch, whereas the WAN network
was deployed in a different switch. The LAN and WAN were configured as 100 Mbps networks while
the control network operated at 1 Gbps. We used three additional PCs in the experiments. One PC was
connected to the LAN emulating the station computer and, in the WAN side, two PCs were deployed: a
good sender trying to transmit legal traffic to the station computer, and a malicious sender sending illegal
messages to the LAN (equivalent to a DoS attack). Every machine of our setup was a 2.8 GHz Pentium
4 PC with 2 GB RAM running Fedora Core 6 with Linux 2.6.18, and XEN 3.0.3 to manage the virtual
machines. As explained in Section 3.4, each CIS physical host uses the XEN virtual machine monitor
to manage two virtual machines: a non-privileged one with 1536 MB of RAM (dom1 – CIS protection
service) and a trusted one with 512 MB of RAM (dom0 – local PRRW).
Recoveries performance. In the first experiment we tried to find appropriate values for parameters TD
(recover time) and TP (recover period). We measured the time needed for each recovery task in a total of
300 recovery procedures executed during CIS operation. Table 1 shows the average, standard deviation,
6Available at http://pax.grsecurity.net/.
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and maximum time for each recovery task: CIS shutdown, CIS rejuvenation by restoring its disk with
a clean image randomly selected from a set of predefined images with different configurations, and the
reboot of this new image. All disk images used in this experiment had sizes of approximately 1.7 GB.
Shutdown Rejuvenation Reboot Total
Average 0.6 72.2 70.1 144.6
Std. Deviation 0.5 1.2 0.3 0.9
Maximum 1.0 74.0 71.0 146.0
Table 1: Time needed (in seconds) for the several steps of a replica recovery (1.7 GB OS images).
From Table 1 one can see that a maximum of 146 seconds (∼ 2.5 minutes) are needed in order to
completely recover a virtual machine in our environment, being most of this time spent on two tasks:
(1.) copying a clean pre-configured disk image from a local repository; and (2.) starting this new image
(including starting the CIS protection service). These tasks could have their time lowered if we were able
to build smaller images, which was not possible with the current Linux distribution we are using (Fedora
Core 6).
The results from the first experiment allowed to define TD = 150 seconds for the remaining ex-
periments described below. Considering that we had n = 4 replicas to tolerate f = 1 faults and k = 1
simultaneous recoveries, we used the expressions defined in Section 2.3.1 to calculate the maximum
time between two recoveries of an individual replica as TP = 1200 seconds (20 minutes). By applying
these values to the Proactive Resilience model [25], we conclude that a malicious adversary has at most
TP + TD = 22.5 minutes to compromise more than f replicas and to harm the safety of the proposed
system (i.e., make the CIS sign an illegal message) in our experimental setup.
Latency and throughput under a DoS attack from the WAN. In the second set of experiments, we
tried to evaluate howmuch legal traffic our intrusion-tolerant firewall can deliver while it is being attacked
by an outsider. In these experiments there is a good sender (in the WAN) constantly transmitting 1470
bytes’ packets of legal traffic at a rate of 500 packets per second to the station computer7 inside the
LAN and there is a malicious sender (in the WAN) launching a DoS attack against the CIS, i.e., sending
between 0 and the maximum possible rate (∼ 100 Mbps) of illegal traffic to it. We measured the received
message rate at the station computer to obtain the throughput of the CIS (the rate at which it can approve
messages) when it has to reject large amounts of illegal traffic. In a different experiment we measured
7It is a huge traffic for a critical infrastructure information system. For example, it represents 500 MMS messages being
sent to a remote device per second.
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the latency imposed by CIS message approval also in the presence of DoS attacks of different rates. In
this latency experiment, the good sender sends a packet with 1470 bytes to the station computer that
acknowledges it. This acknowledgment is not processed by the CIS and we measured the round-trip time
in the good sender. All experiments (bandwidth and latency) were executed 1000 times and Figure 6
shows the average latency and maximum throughput measured in these experiments.
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Figure 6: Latency and throughput of the CIS in forwarding legal messages sent by a good sender in the
WAN to the station computer in the LAN while a malicious host in the WAN is sending illegal traffic
(not approved by the CIS).
The graphs show that the system is almost unaffected by DoS attacks up to 50 Mbps, and then
its behavior degrades gracefully until 70 Mbps. After this value, the latency presents a huge increase
(Figure 6(a)) and the throughput drops to about 250 messages/sec (Figure 6(b)). For 90-100 Mbps of
invalid traffic we observed that sometimes (in 1% of the experiments) the CIS loses some messages (from
15% to 21%), however, it occurs rarely. These results suggest that our design adds modest latency (less
than 2 ms) and no throughput loss even with a reasonably loaded network. The results show also that to
cope with significant DoS attacks (> 70 Mbps) coming from the unprotected network, complimentary
mechanisms must be employed, given that CIS processing latency has a huge increase.
In the third and fourth set of experiments described next, the goal was to evaluate the impact of
proactive/reactive recoveries and replicas’ crash/Byzantine faults in the overall system throughput. In
these experiments there is not a malicious sender in the WAN, just a good sender constantly transmitting
legal traffic at a rate of 5 Mbits per second to the station computer.
Throughput during recoveries and in the presence of crash faults. The third set of experiments
evaluated the impact of proactive recovery and crash faults in the overall system throughput. Figure 7
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presents two time diagrams that show the throughput of the CIS during a complete recovery period (20
minutes) without faults and with one crashed (silent) replica.
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Figure 7: Throughput of the CIS during a complete recovery period (20 minutes) with n= 4 ( f = 1 and
k = 1), with and without crash faults.
The time diagrams of Figure 7 lead to the following conclusions. First, it can be seen that, with-
out faults, recoveries do not have a substantial impact on the perceived throughput of the system (Fig-
ure 7(a)). The minimum observed throughput during recoveries was 4.6 Mbits/second, which represents
a 8% drop in comparison with the expected throughput of 5 Mbits/second. This can be explained by
the fact that proactive recoveries are executed with higher priority than voting procedures and thus may
delay their execution during the recovering periods. Second, the occurrence of crash faults also does
not affect substantially the throughput of the system, even during periodic recoveries (Figure 7(b)). This
happens because we use k= 1 extra replicas to ensure that the system is always available: even with one
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fault and one recovery, there are still two correct replicas ( f + 1) to vote and approve messages. Note
that without these k extra replicas, the system would become completely unavailable in the recovering
periods of Figure 7(b). Third, by comparing the observed throughput with and without crash faults, one
can conclude that the impact of proactive recoveries is smaller when there is a crashed replica during
the entire execution. This happens because 3 replicas generate less vote messages in the wormhole con-
trol channel than 4 replicas. This reduction is sufficient to minimize the impact of the higher priority
proactive recoveries on the vote processing time.
Throughput under a DoS attack from a compromised replica. Finally, the fourth set of experiments
measured the resilience of the CIS against Byzantine faults, i.e., in the presence of up to f compromised
replicas. Given that the CIS algorithms already tolerate up to f Byzantine faults, we choose a malicious
behavior orthogonal to the algorithms logic that could nevertheless endanger the quality of the service
provided by the CIS. In this way, we configured one of the CIS replicas (replica 2) to deploy a DoS
attack 50 seconds after the beginning of CIS execution. This DoS attack floods the LAN with packets
of 1470 bytes sent at a rate of 90 Mbps. We observed how the throughput is affected during this attack
and until the replica being recovered. In order to show the effectiveness of our proactive-reactive recov-
ery approach, we compared what happens when only proactive recoveries are used, and when they are
combined with reactive recoveries. The results are presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8(a) shows that the CIS throughput is affected during the DoS attack from replica 2 when
only proactive recovery is used. The throughput decreases during the attack and reaches a minimum
value of 2.45 Mbps (half of the expected throughput). The attack is stopped when the local wormhole
of replica 2 triggers a proactive recovery after 300 seconds of the initial time instant. Notice that this
recovery should be triggered 150 seconds later but given that we assume here that there are no reactive
recoveries, we do not need the reactive recovery subslots depicted in Figure 3 and proactive recoveries
may be triggered one after the other.
The utility and effectiveness of combining proactive and reactive recoveries is illustrated by Fig-
ure 8(b), which shows that the CIS throughput is minimally affected by the DoS attack from replica 2.
This attack is detected by the remaining replicas and a reactive recovery is triggered immediately after
the attack being launched. The reaction is so fast that the throughput drops to 3.67 Mbps just during one
second and then it gets back to the normal values.
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Figure 8: Throughput of the CIS during 325 seconds with n= 4 ( f = 1 and k= 1). Replica 2 is malicious
and launches a DoS attack to the LAN after 50 seconds. We present graphs with (b) and without (a)
reactive recovery.
5 Related Work
Rejuvenation [15, 11] has been proposed in the 90s as a proactive technique to deal with transient failures
due to software aging. The idea is to periodically rejuvenate some software components to eliminate and
prevent failures. Some works on this field, beginning with [11], developed techniques to choose the
optimal rejuvenation period in order to minimize the downtime of the system. None of the works on
software rejuvenation assume faults caused by malicious adversaries, so the problem that we deal in this
work is much more complicated than software aging.
Several works advocate the use of proactive recovery to make the system tolerate an unbounded
number of malicious faults during its lifetime as long as no more than f faults occur during a bounded
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time period [5, 34, 4, 17]. Recently, some of the authors showed that all these works have some hidden
problems that could be exploited by a smart adversary [24]. The main problem is that these works assume
the asynchronous distributed system model and, under this model it is not possible to guarantee that
recoveries are triggered and executed within known time bounds: an adversary can delay the execution
of the recoveries and be able to corrupt more than f nodes of a system [26]. The work presented in this
work is based on a hybrid distributed system model and thus uses some trusted and timely components
to ensure that replicas are always rejuvenated in accordance to the predefined time bounds [25].
There is a large body of research that aims to reactively recover systems as fast and efficiently as
possible (e.g., [14, 22, 16]). Early work on this field (e.g., [14]) advocates the execution of some kind
of recovery action (in general, restart the monitored process) after a fault is detected. More recently, the
recovery oriented computing project proposed a set of methods to make recovery actions more efficient
and less costly in terms of time [22]. Several techniques were developed in this project, either to detect
failures, restart the minimum set of system components to put the system back to correct operation
and to undo some operator configuration errors. Other works like [16] try to diagnose system faults
through several monitors and evaluate which is the best set of recovery actions that must be taken in
order to recover the system as fast as possible. These works do not consider Byzantine faults or security-
compromised components and also do not rely on redundancy to ensure that the system stays available
during recoveries, the main problems addressed in this work.
The second half of the technical report presents a case study for the PRRW service: an intrusion-
tolerant firewall designed to protect critical infrastructures. As far as we know, there is only one other
work about intrusion-tolerant firewalls: the privacy firewall [33]. This work presents an architecture for
maintaining the privacy of a replicated state machine system [23, 5]: each message from the replicas is
forwarded to the clients if and only if more than f replicas issue this message. In this way, a faulty replica
cannot disclose private information to external processes. The aim of the CIS is completely different of
the privacy firewall since it is a general intrusion-tolerant firewall that implements a protection system
transparent and independent of the application messages that pass through it.
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6 Conclusions
This technical report proposed the combination of proactive and reactive recovery in order to increase
the overall resilience of intrusion-tolerant systems that seek perpetual unattended correct operation. In
addition to the guarantees of the periodic rejuvenations triggered by proactive recovery, our proactive-
reactive recovery service ensures that, as long as a fault exhibited by a replica is detectable, this replica
will be recovered as soon as possible, ensuring that there is always an amount of system replicas available
to sustain system’s correct operation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that reactive and
proactive recovery are combined in a single approach.
We showed how the proactive-reactive recovery service can be used in a concrete scenario, by ap-
plying it to the construction of the CIS, an intrusion-tolerant firewall for critical infrastructures. The
experimental results allow to conclude that the proactive-reactive recovery service is indeed effective in
increasing the resilience of the CIS, namely in the presence of powerful DoS attacks launched either by
outside hosts or inside compromised replicas.
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